## Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000700100017-1



## INCORPECTS FOR POLITICAL STABILITY IN NICARAGUA

The death of President Somoza will stimulate the demand for political change in Nicaragua, although the situation during the next few months will probably not be chaotic.

- A. No one is presently in a position to assume the late dictator's full authority.
- B. The struggle for the eventual succession will be intense.
- C. The position of the 3,500-man National Guard--the country's only armed force--will be crucial.

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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HB 70

DECLASSIFIED

REVIEWER 372044

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- Luis Somoza, the late president's elder son and his constitutional successor, has been named president by congress for the balance of his father's term (ending next May). He is expected to be named at the Liberal Party convention this weekend as the candidate for re-election to a subsequent six-year term. Luis Somoza, however, so not a decisive leader we should be something.
  - The election scheduled for February 1957, is not expected to be free and if he is a candidate, Luis' victory would be virtually assured.
  - This would further stimulate demands for a change in Nicaragua on the part of the opposition and much of the populace.

- 1. After the December crops are in, the rich opposition Conservative leaders—along with militant exiles—may attempt a revolt.
  - 2. National Guard support of the government will be in doubt in the longer run, because many Guard officers hate their present chief, Luis' brother "Tachito", and may force his dismissal.
- III. The assassination may have serious international repercussions.
  - A. The murder weapon was bought in the US by a Nicaraguan exile who lives in El Salvador and has close contacts in the leading Nicaraguan revolutionary exile group.

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- B. Evidence may be found--or manufactured--linking these exiles with Somoza's old enemy, Costa Rican president Figueres.
- C. With or without such evidence, the Nicaraguan may take reprisals against Costa Rica, even to the extent of instigating an attempt on Figueres.